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RECENT DECISIONS
LIBEL AND SLANDER-LIBEL PER SE-PLEADING-PURPOSE

OF

NOT CAPABLE OF LIBELOUS CONSTRUCTION.-Defendant published an account setting forth facts relating to
INNUENDO--PUBLICATION

the criminal career of a murderer, which included the statement that
five days after his marriage to a woman in Chicago, he was "courting"
the plaintiff at a rooming house which she conducted in New York.
Plaintiff contends words so published are libelous per se. Held,
article causing plaintiff embarrassment and discomfort, but having
no bearing upon her personal reputation, not libelous per se. Katherine Kimmerle v. New York Evening Journal, 262 N. Y. 99, 186 N.
E. 217 (1933).
The law of defamation is concerned only with injuries to one's
reputation. Except to the limited extent provided by statute,' there
is no right of privacy. Written words, the effect of which is to
invade privacy and bring undesired notoriety, are without remedy
unless they also appreciably affect reputation. 2 Reputation is said, in
a general way, to be injured by words which tends to expose one to
public hatred, shame, contempt, ridicule, aversion, ostracism, degradation or disgrace, or to induce an evil opinion of one in the minds of
right-thinking persons and to deprive one of their confidence and
friendly intercourse in society.3
In the instant case, the plaintiff's claim that the word "courting"
implied immoral relations, and its use in the article imputed such
relations to her, was rejected. The word "courting," being of vague
content, includes varied conduct and is susceptible to various meanings.4 The article in question, being innocent on its face, and no
innuendo having been proved, the action cannot be maintained. 5
Whether the defamatory language is actionable per se, is a question
for the court, unless it is of such character that an innuendo is needed
to bring out the latent injurious meaning, in which event it must be
left to the jury to determine whether the language was understood in
the defamatory sense set forth in the innuendo. 6 Where the defamatory character of an utterance is latent, it is necessary for the plaintiff
to explain the disingenuous words and phrases and disclose their true
'Lord Moulton, Law and Manners (1924)
'N. Y. CIVIL RIGHTS LAW (1911) §50.
aRuLES OF CIVIL PRACTICE (1921)
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§96; Robinson v. Johnson, 239 Fed. 671

(C. C. A. 8th, 1917); Palmer v. Mahin, 120 Fed. 737 (C. C. A. 8th, 1903);
Turton v. New York Recorder Co., 144 N. Y. 144, 38 N. E. 1009 (1894);
Bennett v. Commercial Advertiser Assn., 230 N. Y. 125, 129 N. E. 343 (1920);
Sydney v. Macfadden Newspaper Pub. Corp., 242 N. Y. 208, 151 N. E. 209
(1926); Mycroft v. Sleight, 90 L. J. 883 (K. B. 1921).
'Horton v. Binghamton Press Co., 122 App. Div. 332, 106 N. Y. Supp.
875 (1907).
'Horton v. Binghamton Press Co., supra note 4; Demos v. New York
Evening Journal, 210 N. Y. 13, 103 N. E. 771 (1913) ; Sydney v. Macfadden
Pub. Corp., supra note 3.
'Velikanje v. Millichamp, 67 Wash. 138, 120 Pac. 876 (1912); ODGERS,
LIBEL AND SLANDER (5th ed.) 115.
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meaning. 7 Where, in an action for imputation of unchastity or
immorality, or where the alleged libelous words are susceptible of
various meanings, one being lack of chastity, the words charged are
actionable only by reason of extraneous facts, these facts must be
averred so as to show that an actionable charge has been imputed.8
This is accomplished by properly alleging those extrinsic facts and
circumstances in the past and present relations of the parties, or the
facts surrounding the publication, by which the jury shall be justified
in giving to words, not ordinarily actionable, a libelous signification.9
However, the meaning of the words cannot be extended by innuendo
beyond their natural import, aided by reference to the extrinsic facts
with which they may be connected. 10 The words must be construed
in the sense which hearers of common and reasonable understanding
would ascribe to them, even though particular individuals, better
informed on the matter alluded to, might form a different judgment
on the subject."
In general, the right to an action for libel, where special damages
are not sought, depends upon a publication of matter affecting the
reputation of the plaintiff, of that character which is defined by law as
necessarily causing actionable damage, made or authorized by defendant in violation of a legal duty.
C. M. DE P.

MARRIAGE-FRAUDULENT

REPRESENTATIONS-REOVERY

OF

DAMAGES.-After having avoided her marriage on the ground of

fraud, the plaintiff brought this action against the father and sister of
her former husband for false representations. The fraud alleged in
this case concerned the state of health and the moral habits of her
then prospective husband. A suspicion arose in the minds of the
plaintiff and her family that the groom had been suffering with some
'Hemmens v. Nelson, 138 N. Y. 517, 34 N. E. 342 (1893); Crashley v.
Press Pub. Co., 179 N. Y. 27, 71 N. E. 258 (1904) ; Quinn v. Prudential Ins.
Co., 116 Ia. 552, 90 N. W. 349 (1902) ; Belknap v. Ball, 83 Mich. 583, 47 N. W.
674 (1890).
'Grant v. New York Herald Co., 138 App. Div. 727, 123 N. Y. Supp. 449
(lst Dept. 1910) ; Moore v. Levy, 191 N. Y. Supp. 165 (1921); Hemmens v.
Nelson, supra note 7.
'Hanchett v. Chiarovich, 101 Fed. 742 (C. C. A. 9th, 1900); Penry v.
Dozier, 161 Ala. 292, 49 So. 909 (1909), noting the meaning of inducement,
colloquium and innuendo in common law pleading; Quinn v. Prudential Ins. Co.,
supra note 7.
10 Woodruff v. Bradstreet Co., 116 N. Y. 217, 23 N. E. 354 (1889) ; Simons
v. Burnham, 102 Mich. 189, 60 N. W. 476 (1894) ; Blake v. Smith, 19 R. I. 476,
34 Atl. 995 (1896).
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